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A claim may be taken only once with respect to any particular 
gallon of alcohol or biodiesel.22 
Claiming the credit 
To claim the biodiesel credit or the biodiesel mixture credit, 
the taxpayer must obtain a certification from the producer (or 
importer) of the biodiesel identifying the product produced and 
the percentage of biodiesel and agri-biodiesel in the product.23 
IRS has published model certification forms.24 
The biodiesel fuels credit is claimed on Form 8864, Biodiesel 
Fuels Credit.25 
A credit is allowed26 against the tax imposed on taxable fuel.27 
The credit is equal to the sum of the alcohol fuel mixture credit 
and the biodiesel mixture credit.28 The credit is allowable to the 
person who produces the mixture for sale or use in the producer’s 
trade or business.29 The credit is claimed on Form 720, “Quarterly 
Federal Excise Tax Return.”30 
To the extent the sum of the alcohol fuel mixture credit and 
biodiesel mixture credit exceeds a person’s I.R.C. § 4081 liability, 
for any quarter, an income tax credit or payment is allowable to 
the producer of the mixture.31 The credit is also claimed on Form 
720, “Quarterly Federal Excise Tax return,” or Form 8849, “Claim 
for Refund of Excise Taxes.”32 
Recapture of the credit 
If a credit was claimed for the retail sale of biodiesel and any 
person mixes the biodiesel or uses the biodiesel other than as a 
fuel, a tax is imposed on that person.33 The amount of the tax is 
the per-gallon rate originally used to compute the biodiesel credit 
multiplied by the number of gallons of biodiesel.34 
Coordination with excise tax credit 
The biodiesel fuels credit is also coordinated with the excise 
tax credit allowed under newly enacted I.R.C. Secs. 6426 and 
6427(e). The amount of the biodiesel fuels credit determined with 
respect to any biodiesel is reduced to take into account any benefit 
claimed with respect to the biodiesel under the excise tax credit 
provision.35 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). See Harl and 
McEowen, “American Jobs Creation Act of 2004: A Summary 
of Selected Provisions,” 15 Agric. L. Dig. 161, 163-164 (2004). 
2 I.R.C. § 40A.

3 I.R.C. § 40A(a).

4 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(1).

5 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(2).

6 See I.R.C. § 38.

7 I.R.C. § 196(c).

8 I.R.C. § 40A(e).

9 I.R.C. § 87(2).

10 I.R.C. § 40A(d)(4).

11 Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2 (published December 15, 2004).

12 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(1)(A).

13 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(1)(B).

14 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(1)(C).

15 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(1)(D).

16 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(2).

17 See Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2(e).

18 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(2)(B).

19 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(3).

20 Id. 
21 I.R.C. § 40A(d)(2).

22 I.R.C. § 40A(c).

23 I.R.C. § 40A(b)(4).

24 Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2.

25 Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2(e).

26 I.R.C. § 6426.

27 I.R.C. § 4081.

28 Notice 2005-2, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2©.

29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2(d). 
32 Notice 2005-4, I.R.B. 2005-2, § 2©. 
33 I.R.C. § 40A(d)(3). 
34 Id. 
35 I.R.C. § 40A(c). 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL

EXEMPTIONS

PENSION PLAN. The debtor claimed an exemption under 
Section 541(c)(2) for the debtor’s interest in an employer-provide 
pension plan. The pension plan was a tax sheltered annuity plan 
under I.R.C. § 403(b) and was subject to an anti-alienation clause. 
The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption, arguing that the 
annuity plan did not qualify for the exemption which applied only 
to trusts. The court held that the annuity-trust distinction was not 
as important as whether the pension plan was subject to sufficient 
restrictions on the debtor’s ability to obtain or assign the funds. 
The court held that the debtor’s annuity pension plan had sufficient 
restrictions to qualify for the Section 541(c)(2) exemption. In re 
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Gould, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,318 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2005). 
FEDERAL FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS. The debtor 
planted seed wheat and seed cotton crops in 2001, and the crops 
suffered from drought. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 in May 
2002 and the case was converted to Chapter 7 in January 2003. 
The Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003 was signed into law on 
February 20, 2003 and provided for payments to farmers for 
weather-related crop losses. In January 2004 the debtor applied 
for payments for the 2001 crop losses and received a payment in 
February 2004. The Bankruptcy Court held that the payments 
were estate property because the payments arose out of the 
prepetition crops. The Bankruptcy Court noted that all of the 
conditions for eligibility for the drought payments existed prior 
to the bankruptcy filing and the vesting of the rights in the 
payments, by passage of the legislation and the debtor’s 
application for the payments, was the only event which occurred 
post-petition. On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that 
the mere expectancy of legislation which would provide 
compensation for crop losses was too contingent to include the 
payments in the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court had 
also held that the disaster payments were not included in the 
bankruptcy estate under Section 541(a)(6) as the proceeds of 
estate property because no crops existed on the filing date. The 
District Court affirmed this holding. In re Bracewell, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5799 (M.D. Ga. 2005), aff’g in part and rev’g in 
part, 310 B.R. 472 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004). 
CHAPTER 12 
ELIGIBILITY. As part of a settlement of federal farm loans, 
the debtor transferred title to the debtor’s farm by deed to the 
FmHA (now the FSA). About five years later, the FSA offered to 
rent the land to the debtor with an option to purchase the farm at 
the end of the lease. The debtor notified the FSA that the debtor 
wanted to exercise the option but the debtor did not sign the 
purchase contract; instead the debtor filed administrative appeals 
over the purchase price and then filed for Chapter 12 in an attempt 
to cramdown the amount to be paid under the purchase option. 
The FSA filed a motion for the debtor to assume or reject the 
option purchase contract and the Bankruptcy Court ordered the 
debtor to assume or reject the contract. The debtor refused to do 
either action because the debtor argued that the debtor had always 
retained an ownership interest in the farm. The Bankruptcy Court 
held that the farm was owned by the FSA under the voluntary 
conveyance by the debtor to satisfy the original FmHA debts; 
therefore, because the debtor had allowed the option to lapse and 
refused to assume the option contract, the farm was not estate 
property and the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12. The 
Bankruptcy Court ruling was upheld on appeal. In re Dye, 360 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2004). The debtor then filed a quiet title action 
titled “Complaint to Compel Mortgage Foreclosure with Owner’s 
Right of Redemption on Real Estate.” The court held that the 
action was barred by the 12-year statute of limitations imposed 
by the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409 because the original 
conveyance to the FmHA occurred more than 12 years before 
the filing of the current action. In the alternative, the court also 
held that the debtor’s action was barred by res judicata from the 
final judgment in the bankruptcy case. Dye v. United States, 
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6967 (7th Cir. 2005). 
The debtors had borrowed operating funds from a Farm Credit 
Services bank for their mint farm but defaulted on the loan and 
had to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In that bankruptcy case, the 
debtors received a discharge of unsecured loans, including the 
portion of the bank loan above the value of the farm. After the 
loan default, the debtors leased the farmland under cash and 
share leases. The leases required the debtors to maintain 
irrigation equipment, often on a daily basis. The debtors filed 
another Chapter 12 case and the bank objected to the debtors’ 
eligibility for Chapter 12 because (1) the debtor’s debts exceeded 
the $1.5 million limit and (2) the debtors were not engaged in 
farming. The bank argued that the full amount of the unpaid 
loan should be included in the debtor’s debts, not just the portion 
secured by the fair market value of the farm. The court held that 
the unsecured portion of the loan was discharged in the previous 
Chapter 7 case and was no longer a personal obligation of the 
debtors; therefore, the unsecured portion discharged in the 
Chapter 7 case was not included in the debts for purposes of 
eligibility for Chapter 12. The court also held that the debtors 
were engaged in farming because most of the leases were 
sharecrop leases and the debtors were required to maintain a 
substantial involvement in the farming operations under the 
leases. The court noted that the structure of the leases subjected 
the debtors to much of the risk of the farming operations. In re 
Osborne, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 679 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005). 
CONTRACTS 
AERIAL SPRAYING. The plaintiff was a crop farmer who 
hired the defendant to aerially spray the plaintiff’s crops with a 
fungicide. The defendant performed the spraying and the crops 
were harvested. The plaintiff claimed that the spraying was done 
too early to be effective and the crop yield was reduced as a 
result. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and the defendant 
sought and obtained a summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s 
failure to comply with the notification requirements of N.D. Cent. 
Code § 4-35-21.1(1). The statute prohibits a civil action arising 
out of damage to crops from the application of a pesticide if the 
claimant does not provide notice of verified losses to the 
applicator within 60 days after the claimant knew or should have 
known about the damage alleged. The plaintiff argued that the 
statute did not apply because the breach of contract action did 
not arise out of any damage from the application of a pesticide 
but from the failure of the defendant to perform properly under 
the contract. The court agreed and held that the statutory 
notification was not required and did not prevent this action; 
therefore, summary judgment was improper.  Pratt v.Altendorf, 
692 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 2005). 
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
FOOD SAFETY. The (FSIS) is soliciting proposals for 
cooperative agreement projects to be funded in fiscal year 2005. 
Proposals should be made in one or more of the following 
cooperative agreement program areas: (1) food animal 
production, transportation, and marketing; (2) small and very 
small inspected meat, poultry, or egg product establishments; 
(3) retail stores, food service establishments, and other 
inspection-exempt small businesses processing or handling 
meat, poultry, and egg products; (4) applications of new 
technologies that will permit small and very small meat, poultry, 
and egg product establishments to produce safer products; and 
(5) enhancement of laboratory testing capability of the Food 
Emergency Response Network for microbiological threat 
agents. 70 Fed. Reg. 20517 (April 20, 2005). 
ORGANIC FOODS. The USDA has announced that six 
positions are open on the National Organic Standards Board 
(NSOB): organic producer (2 positions), consumer/public 
interest (3 positions), and USDA accredited certifying agent 
(1 position). The Secretary will make the appointments for the 
5-year terms. Nominations should be sent to Ms. Katherine E. 
Benham, Advisory Board Specialist, USDA-AMS-TMP-NOP, 
1400 Independence Avenue, SW., Room 4008-So., Ag Stop 
0268, Washington, D.C. 20250. 70 Fed. Reg. 20346 (April 19, 
2005). 
SHARED APPRECIATION AGREEMENTS . The 
plaintiffs (the case consolidated two appeals)  entered into 
several 10-year shared appreciation agreements with the USDA 
as part of a farm loan write-down. When the agreements 
expired, the USDA had the property appraised and sought 
payment of one-half of the appreciation in value of the farms 
during the 10-year agreements. The court cited Stahl v. USDA, 
327 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2003); Pauly v. USDA, 348 F.3d 1143 
(9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Israel v. USDA., 282 F.3d 521 
(7th Cir. 2002) to support its holding that the USDA was entitled 
to recover one-half of appreciation in value of the farms during 
the 10-year agreements. The court noted that the agreements 
and the written instructions distributed with the agreements 
notified the plaintiffs that one-half of the appreciation would 
need to be paid at the end of the agreements. The plaintiffs 
argued that the USDA should be estopped from claiming the 
right to payments because local officials told the plaintiffs that 
nothing would need to be paid if the plaintiffs continued to 
farm the property after the 10-year agreements expired. The 
court held that the USDA was not estopped because the 
plaintiffs did not show any affirmative misconduct by the USDA 
or its employees. Estate of James v. USDA, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6705 (6th Cir. 2005).
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers, husband 
and wife, created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the 
taxpayers, their children and charitable organizations qualified 
under I.R.C. §§ 170(c) and 2522(a). The trust provided for 
annual payments to the charities equal to a fixed percentage 
of the value of all trust assets. The IRS ruled that the trust 
would be allowed a deduction under I.R.C. § 641(c)(1) for 
amounts paid to charities from trust income. No deduction 
was allowed for amounts paid from trust principal unless the 
amount was previously included in trust income and no other 
deduction was allowed for that amount. The IRS also ruled 
that the taxpayer could claim a gift tax charitable deduction 
under I.R.C. § 2522 equal to one-half of the present value of 
the guaranteed annuity interest, valued as of the date the 
property was transferred to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 200516005, 
Nov. 30, 2004. 
DISCLAIMERS. The taxpayer was a beneficiary of four 
trusts established by grandparents. The taxpayer had received 
some discretionary income distributions from one trust but 
no distributions from principal. The taxpayer executed written 
disclaimers of the taxpayer’s contingent remainder interests 
in the trusts within nine months of reaching majority age. 
The IRS ruled that the disclaimers were effective and did not 
result in any gift tax liability to the taxpayer.  Ltr. Rul. 
200516004, Jan. 6, 2005. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ALIMONY. The taxpayer’s divorce decree granted joint 
custody of the taxpayer’s children but primary care 
responsibility to the taxpayer’s spouse. The decree required 
the taxpayer to make monthly payments which were 
unallocated “family support” to the spouse. The court held 
that the “family support” payments were deductible alimony 
payments because the taxpayer had no obligation to make 
the payments to anyone if the spouse died. The court held 
that the taxpayer’s obligation to support the children under 
California law did not give rise to a substitute payment 
liability for the “family support” payments. The taxpayer was 
not allowed an alimony deduction for payments made to two 
psychiatrists for treatment for the children because such 
payments were not provided in the divorce decree. Berry v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-91. 
CORPORATIONS 
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayers was the 
sole shareholder of a corporation which constructed 
foundations for residences and apartment buildings. The 
corporation had separate records and bank account but the 
69 Agricultural Law Digest 
taxpayer used the corporation’s checking account to pay 
personal expenses. The corporation did not pay compensation 
or dividends to the taxpayer. The corporation recorded the 
personal expenses paid with corporate funds as “advances.” 
In one tax year, the corporation’s accountant reclassified a 
portion of the advance account as wages and reported the 
wages on an amended Form 941. The taxpayer included that 
amount in income. No loan agreement was executed for the 
advances, no collateral was given for the advances, no interest 
was charged, and the advances were not reported on the 
corporation’s federal returns. The court held that the personal 
expenses paid by the corporation were constructive dividends 
to the taxpayer. Bruecher v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2005-52. 
INTEREST. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari 
in the following case. The taxpayer corporation operated a 
car dealership and was on the accrual method. The president 
of the corporation, a cash-basis taxpayer, owned all of the 
stock of the corporation. The president loaned $2.339 million 
to the corporation and the corporation recorded accrued 
interest due on the note, but did not pay interest to the 
president. The corporation did not claim any interest 
deduction because of I.R.C. § 267(a)(2). The president later 
assigned the note to an unrelated entity.  On the 1994 return, 
the president reported a capital loss of $500,000 based on 
the assignment of the note. The corporation claimed a 
deduction of $1.049 million representing the accrued, but 
unpaid interest on the note that the president sold to the 
unrelated entity.  As a result, the corporation claimed a net 
operating loss of $810,000 in 1994 and tried to carry it back 
to 1991 and 1992. IRS claimed that only the portion of the 
accrued interest attributable to 1994 ($261,663) was 
allowable as a deduction because the corporation was not 
subject to the restrictions of I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) for 1994. The 
balance of the accrued interest deduction was disallowed. 
Ronald Moran Cadillac, Inc. v. United States, 2004-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,394 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004). 
DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer lived with a parent and two 
minor sisters. The taxpayer was the only employed person 
in the household but the parent received public assistance 
for the sisters. The taxpayer paid the parent rent but no 
payments for the sisters’ care. The taxpayer claimed the sisters 
as dependents and claimed earned income credit and the child 
tax credit based on the sisters as qualifying children. The 
court held that the taxpayer could not claim the sisters as 
dependents because the taxpayer failed to prove that the 
taxpayer provided over one-half of the financial support for 
the sisters. The court also held that the taxpayer was not 
entitled to the earned income credit because the parent was 
the primary caregiver for the sisters. The court held that the 
taxpayer was not entitled to the child tax credit for the sisters 
because the sisters did not qualify as dependents of the 
taxpayer.  Somsukcharean v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2005-49. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On April 1, 2005, the President 
determined that certain areas in Maine were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 USC § 5121) as a result of a record snow fall, which 
began on March 9, 2005. FEMA-3209-EM. Accordingly, 
taxpayers in the affected areas who sustained losses may deduct 
them on their 2004 federal income tax returns. 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS. The Congress 
has passed and the President signed legislation which excludes 
qualified disaster mitigation payments from income. Qualified 
disaster mitigation payments are defined as “any amount which 
is paid pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (as in effect on the date of the 
enactment of this subsection) or the National Flood Insurance 
Act (as in effect on such date) to or for the benefit of the owner 
of any property for hazard mitigation with respect to such 
property. Such term shall not include any amount received for 
the sale or disposition of any property.” The legislation prohibits 
any increase in the income tax basis of property for the amount 
excluded from income under this provision. The legislation also 
denies any credit or deduction as to any expenditure made with 
an amount excluded from income under this provision. Pub. 
L. 109-7, 109th Cong., 1st. Sess (2005), adding I.R.C. § 
139(g). 
EMPLOYEE BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was 
employed as a college instructor and claimed travel, business 
and meals expenses on Form 2106, Employee Business 
Expenses. The taxpayer did not report any reimbursements from 
the college and received only partial reimbursements for some 
of the travel expenses. The taxpayer did not seek reimbursement 
for many of the business expenses and failed to obtain 
reimbursement for some of the travel expenses because the 
taxpayer did not follow the college rules for purchasing tickets. 
The court held that some of the travel expenses were not allowed 
because the taxpayer failed to substantiate the business nature 
of the expense sufficient to separate the personal from the 
business purposes of the trips. The court also held that deductions 
were not allowed for business expenses for which the taxpayer 
could have sought reimbursement but did not or which were 
denied for improper procedures by the taxpayer. Whalen v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2005-45. 
FUEL CREDIT. The IRS has announced that the reference 
price that is to be used in determining the availability of the 
I.R.C. § 29 tax credit for the production of fuel from 
nonconventional sources for calendar year 2004 is $36.75. Since 
this amount does not exceed $23.50 multiplied by the inflation 
adjustment factor (2.1853), the I.R.C. § 29(b)(1) phaseout of 
the credit will not occur for any qualified fuel based on the 
above reference price. The nonconventional  source fuel credit 
for 2004 is $6.56 per barrel-of-oil equivalent of qualified fuels. 
Notice 2004-33, I.R.B. 2005-17. 
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer was a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer which manufactured and sold prescription drugs. 
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Under a rebate agreement with the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the taxpayer paid rebates to state Medicaid 
agencies for amounts paid by those agencies to drug retailers 
for outpatient drugs. The IRS ruled that the rebates were a 
purchase price adjustment and should be subtracted from gross 
receipts from the sale of the drugs by the taxpayer and not 
taken as a deduction from gross income. Rev. Rul. 2005-28, 
I.R.B. 2005-19. 
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The decedent 
purchased a deferred annuity contract with payments to begin 
in the future. The decedent named an heir as remainder 
beneficiary of the contract. The contract provided that if the 
decedent died before the annuity starting date, the beneficiary 
would receive a death benefit equal to the account value, 
payable in a lump sum or periodic payments as consistent 
with I.R.C. § 72(s). The decedent also had the right to surrender 
the contract during the decedent’s life in exchange for the 
account value. The decedent died before the annuity start date 
and the beneficiary received a death benefit which exceeded 
the decedent’s investment in the annuity. The IRS ruled that, 
because the amount received in excess of the decedent’s 
investment would have been income to the decedent if the 
decedent had surrendered the contract during life, the excess 
amount received by the beneficiary was income in respect of 
decedent and included in the beneficiary’s gross income. The 
IRS noted that the beneficiary would be entitled to a deduction, 
under I.R.C. § 691(c), if the decedent’s estate was subject to 
estate tax. The IRS also ruled that the result was the same 
whether the beneficiary took a lump sum or periodic payments. 
Rev. Rul. 2005-30, I.R.B. 2005-20. 
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that the TeleFile 
program will be discontinued after August 16, 2005. Ann. 
2005-26, I.R.B. 2005-17. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
May 2005 
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 3.54 3.51 3.49 3.48 
110 percent AFR 3.90 3.86 3.84 3.83 
120 percent AFR 4.25 4.21 4.19 4.17 
Mid-term 
AFR 4.28 4.24 4.22 4.20 
110 percent AFR 4.71 4.66 4.63 4.62 
120 percent AFR 5.15 5.09 5.06 5.04 
Long-term 
AFR 4.83 4.77 4.74 4.72 
110 percent AFR 5.32 5.25 5.22 5.19 
120 percent AFR 5.80 5.72 5.68 5.65 
Rev. Rul. 2005-27, I.R.B. 2005-19. 
TAX SHELTERS. The taxpayer corporation promoted and 
marketed abusive tax schemes through seminars, the internet 
and promotional literature. The schemes involved the creation 
and use of sham entities such as trusts, charitable foundations 
and limited liability companies in order to eliminate or reduce 
income tax or self-employment tax. The taxpayer made false 
claims as to the tax effect of such schemes. The taxpayer failed 
to respond to an IRS action for a permanent injunction, the 
court entered a default judgment and ordered a permanent 
injunction against the taxpayer from participating in promoting 
and marketing abusive tax schemes. United States v. 
Anderson, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,306 (M.D. Fla. 
2005). 
NUISANCE 
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION. The plaintiffs were 
neighbors across a road from the defendant’s grain elevator. 
The defendant discovered that its property line extended across 
the road and decided to expand the road to accommodate more 
truck traffic. The defendant had some trees removed on the 
plaintiffs’ properties as part of the road widening construction. 
The plaintiffs sued in nuisance and trespass, alleging that the 
increased traffic would generate noise, dust and exhaust fumes 
on their property. The defendant claimed exemption from the 
nuisance action under N.D. Cent. Code § 42-04-02 and argued 
that the trespass claims were not supported by any evidence of 
actual trespass. The court noted that Section 42-04-02 had 
recently been amended to include companies which marketed 
farm products in the definition of agricultural operation; 
therefore, the defendant was exempt from nuisance suits under 
the statute. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that any additional dust would be created that 
would drift on to their property from the use of the expanded 
road; therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment for the 
defendant was proper.  Tibert v. Slominski, 692 N.W.2d 133 
(N.D. 2005). 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff manufactured a pre-emergence 
herbicide for use on peanuts. The defendants were peanut 
growers who used the herbicide and experienced crop losses 
which they blamed on the failure of the herbicide to control 
weeds. The defendants filed claims for misrepresentation, false 
advertising, breach of warranty, and statutory claims for 
deceptive and fraudulent trade practices. The plaintiff filed an 
action for declaratory judgment that the defendants’ claims were 
preempted by FIFRA. The defendants claimed that the 
plaintiff’s agents made representations as to the effectiveness 
of the herbicide which were not included on the label but the 
trial court found that the defendants failed to provide any 
evidence of these additional representations. The Court of 
Appeals held that the defendants’ claims were preempted by 
FIFRA because the claims were based on information provided 
on the label. The U.S Supreme court reversed and remanded 
the case, holding that the defendant’s state law actions did not 
amount to a label “requirement.” The Court stated that 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136v(b) prohibited states from imposing any requirements 
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for labels in addition to or different from those required by 
FIFRA. The Court stated that the statute created a two part 
test: (1) the imposition of a requirement and (2) the requirement 
had to be in addition to or different from the requirements 
imposed by FIFRA. Section 136v(b) has been cited to prohibit 
any state common law action which could be avoided by the 
manufacturer’s changing the label. The Court held that FIFRA 
did not preempt state common law actions which did not 
require a pesticide manufacturer to change a label but would 
merely motivate a manufacturer to do so. The Court stated 
that the defendant’s Texas fraud and negligent failure to warn 
actions could be preempted by FIFRA only if the elements of 
the actions placed requirements on the pesticide labels which 
were “in addition to or different from” the FIFRA label 
requirements. The Court remanded this issue to the Court of 
Appeals for a determination on that issue. The court held that 
the actions for defective design, defective manufacture, 
negligent testing and breach of warranty were not preempted 
by FIFRA because these actions did not enforce any 
requirement on the pesticide label. The case could have a 
dramatic effect on the viability of pesticide and herbicide tort 
cases. In dicta, the Court indicated that a presumption may 
exist against preemption: “The long history of tort litigation 
against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to 
the presumption against pre-emption, for Congress surely 
would have expressed its intention more clearly if it had meant 
to deprive injured parties of a long-available form of 
compensation. Moreover, this history emphasizes the 
importance of providing an incentive to manufacturers to use 
the utmost care in distributing inherently dangerous items.” 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3706 
(Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’g and rem’g, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 
2003), aff’g, 205 F. Supp. 2d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
TRACTOR. The plaintiff was injured when the gas tank 
on a tractor manufactured by the defendant overheated and 
burst. The evidence showed that the vent hole on the gas tank 
had been plugged with a screw and the exhaust system had 
been converted from a vertical, through-the-hood, system to 
an underslung system without a proper extension or breather 
tube. The improperly installed exhaust system caused excess 
heat to be transferred to the gas tank and the blocked vent 
prevented hot gas from escaping safely. The plaintiff filed an 
action in strict liability and the defendant argued that the tractor 
was not in the condition in which it was manufactured. The 
court held that the plaintiff failed to rebut the evidence that 
the screw in the gas tank vent was a change in condition from 
the original manufactured condition of the tractor and that the 
screw substantially contributed to the injuries suffered by the 
plaintiff. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant 
on the strict liability claim. Brinkman v. International Truck 
and Engine Corp., 351 S. Supp.2d 880 (W.D. Wis. 2004). 
PROPERTY 
OPTION TO PURCHASE. The defendant owned farmland 
which included their residence and entered into a real estate 
option agreement which granted the plaintiff an option to 
purchase the farmland. The agreement provided that the 
defendants had the right for life to lease the residence and five 
acres of surrounding land after the purchase. The option was 
executed and the defendant continued to live in the residence. 
The defendant had allowed the defendant’s child and family to 
occupy the second story of the residence and, when they moved 
out, the defendant sublet the second floor to third parties. The 
plaintiff asked the defendant to execute a written lease which 
prohibited subleases but the defendant refused, arguing that 
the option agreement did not require a written lease nor prohibit 
subleases. The court held that the option agreement created a 
lease for a definite term, the life of the defendant, and did not 
require any written lease or prohibit subleases; therefore, the 
defendant was not required to execute a written lease and could 
sublease a portion of the residence. Sugarhill Limited v. Brezo, 
2005 Ohio 1889, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1811 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005). 
RAILROAD RIGHT-OF-WAY. The plaintiffs were rural 
land owners who owned land surrounding railroad tracks which 
were abandoned. The tracks were converted to recreational trails 
under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 
U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. The plaintiffs argued that, upon the 
abandonment of the tracks by the railroads, the right-of-way 
reverted to the ownership of the surrounding property owners; 
therefore, the conversion to public trails was a taking by the 
government without compensation in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. The court distinguished the approach among the 
different methods by which the original owners of the 
surrounding property acquired their property. For the original 
owners who acquired title to the property under land grants 
issued after the railroad was granted a right-of-way,  the court 
held that the United States did not retain a reversionary interest 
in the right-of-way property and the abandoned track property 
reverted to the current owners; therefore, the conversion to 
public trails was a governmental taking which entitled these 
owners to compensation. Hash v. United States, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
TRESPASS. The parties were neighbors and a public road 
was located between their properties. The road and a portion 
of the right-of-way on the defendant’s side of the road were 
located on the plaintiff’s property. The defendant’s main 
driveway had direct access to the highway but the defendant 
had to cross over the right-of-way in order to access the public 
road at a second point. The plaintiff argued that the defendant 
was trespassing when the defendant accessed the public 
highway over the right-of-way. The defendant argued that access 
to the public highway could not be restricted by the plaintiff. 
The trial jury verdict found that the defendant did trespass when 
the defendant used the second access point, but the trial court 
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overruled the jury verdict and ruled that the defendant’s second 
point access was not a trespass. The appellate court reversed, 
holding that the defendant did not have a right, as a member of 
the public, to have two access points to the public road where 
the second access would require traveling over private property. 
The court noted that the jury verdict was supported by the 
evidence that the defendant had to cross the plaintiff’s land to 
use the second access point and that the defendant had another 
access to the highway.  Geyso v. Daly, 691 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
STATE REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY. A farmer had a feedlot 
for 35 cattle and applied for a conditional use permit to build a 
hog feedlot with a capacity of over 1000 hogs but which would 
be used for only 995 animal units, including the existing 35 cattle. 
The application included a plan to spread the manure on 
surrounding fields in replacement of other nitrates, resulting in 
no net increase in the nitrates applied to the land. The defendant 
county determined that, under Minn. Stat. § 116D.04(2a)(d), 
the farmer did not need to submit an environmental impact 
statement (EIS). The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that 
an EIS was required, arguing that (1) the statute did not apply 
because (a) it was enacted after the defendant’s decision and (b) 
the farmer’s feedlot did not qualify for the exemption; and (2) 
only the Pollution Control Agency (PCA) could make a 
determination as to the need for the EIS. The court held that the 
statute could be applied here because the application affected 
prospective actions. The plaintiff argued that the exemption 
applied only to feedlots with less than 1,000 AUs capacity and 
the farmer’s application to use the feedlot for less than 100 AUs 
was not a relevant factor. Because the farmer’s feedlot had a 
capacity of over 1,000 AUs, the facility was not eligible for the 
EIS exemption. The court held that the farmer’s feedlot was not 
exempt from the EIS because the feedlot had a physical capacity 
of over 1,000 AUs, whether or not the farmer would be restricted 
by the conditional use permit to limit the number of AUs raised 
in the facility to 995. The court also held that the county was 
required to submit the EIS determination to the PCA because 
the feedlot had a capacity over 1,000 AUs.  Berne Area Alliance 
for Quality Living v. Dodge County Bd. of Comm’rs, 2005 
Minn. App. LEXIS 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
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